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Abstract.  The European Union sovereign-debt crisis brings up 
again the problem of current account sustainability, the fiscal policy 
sustainability and the public debt sustainability, as well as the 
interconditionality between them. On the background of the severe 
structural problems, the lack of competitiveness has constituted the main 
factor resulting in the severe deterioration of the European public 
finances. The external deficits have put additional pressure upon the 
fiscal deficits. Practically, they entered a vicious circle, to a great extent 
due to the extremely different economic evolutions of the weak economies 
opposite to the strongly structurally advanced and solid economies. This 
study makes a risk analysis of the public debt sustainability in Romania 
for the period 2010-2015, under the circumstances in which it will enter 
the Euro zone in the near future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Each financial/economic crisis has its own individual features, but most 
of them have a number of common characteristics. This also applies to the 
current world crisis. Charles Kindleberger's paper “Manias, Panics and 
Crashes” transformed Hyman Minsky's typology into a more modern 
expression. The Euro zone experienced, besides the entire world economy, each 
of the steps described below. Until 2008, the moment when the crisis appeared 
in USA, The Euro zone improved well enough. The Euro zone specific problem 
was that many of the constituent economies could not have finished the 
convergence process which had been started before 1999. Moreover, some of 
them even recorded deviations from the levels considered as sustainable: first of 
all, the competitiveness of the participant states was extremely heterogeneous, 
this resulting in unsustainable current account deficits and external debts; 
secondly, the public sectors deficits and, consequently, the levels of the public 
debt were not sustainable in some of the countries; thirdly, also the private 
sector deficits proved to be unsustainable and, consequently, the levels of the 
private debts. According to the typology of Minsky/Kindleberger
(1), the crises 
have the following evolution: 
1. The events start with a “dislocation”, an exogenous shock outside the 
macroeconomic system (a war, adoption, to a large extent, of a new 
invention, a political event, etc.). 
2. The extension of the bank loan results in the increase of the money 
supply and it supplies the economic growth. This may result in the 
creation of new banks, in the development of new loan instruments and 
in the unlimited extension of the personal loans until the moment when 
the phenomenon practically becomes impossible to be controlled.  
3. The demand increases, the prices also get increased, new profit opportu-
nities, new companies and investors appear. The revenues increases 
stimulate the additional investments, new increases of revenues... 
4. The soap bubbles develop. The excessive trade extends from one country 
to another, through arbitration for goods and internationally traded assets, 
the capital flows or, simply, the psychological effects of transmission. The 
interest rates, the velocity of money and the prices, all of them continue to 
get increased. Some initiates profit and sell everything.  
5. Financial disaster. Everybody start to be aware of development of a rush 
for cash – in order to get rid of assets and to obtain cash –, this resulting in 
some speculative lenders' incapacity to return their loans. As the disaster 
persists, the speculators realize that the market cannot grow more. It is the 
moment for them to draw back, and the rush to transform the real or 
financial assets into cash for a long term turns into panic. Sustainability of the public debt and the financial crisis 
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6.   Crisis. The trigger may be the failure of a bank or of a big 
company/corporation, the revealing of a cheat or of a defalcation, or a 
price decrease of the initial speculation object. The prices get 
decreased. The bankruptcies get increased. Closeout is sometimes 
required, but this cannot degenerate into panic. The banks cease to 
grant loans for collateral assets, of which prices get decreased. 
When the crisis occurred, the states recording unsustainable positions 
from the points of view described above proved to be extremely vulnerable, 
with all the risks deriving from here. When the crisis appeared in the whole 
world, it shook even the most solid European economies, and, until the end of 
2009, the Euro zone entered the first stage of a severe public debt crisis. On the 
background of the severe structural problems, the lack of competitiveness has 
constituted the main factor resulting in the severe deterioration of the European 
public finances. The external deficits have put additional pressure upon the 
fiscal deficits. Practically, they entered a vicious circle, to a great extent due to 
the extremely different economic evolutions of the weak economies opposite to 
the strongly structurally advanced and solid economies. The European Union 
sovereign-debt crisis brings up again the problem of the interconditionality 
between the current account sustainability, the fiscal policy sustainability and 
the public debt sustainability. The recent crisis has demonstrated, one more 
time, the fact that the pro-cyclical fiscal policies, the lack of structural reforms 
and the lack of support for pro-increase and competitiveness structural reforms 
have generated external imbalances, unsustainable public debts accompanied by 
high risks of non-payment of the debt service.  
 
2. Public debt sustainability. Effects of a monetary union 
 
The problem of the budget deficit sustainability is as follows: the budget 
deficit determines the increase of the public debt, which will have to be paid in 
the future. If the interest rate to the public debt exceeds the economic growth 
rhythm, the public debt will increase faster than the gross domestic product. 
Eventually, this dynamics results in unsustainable deficits which require 
corrective actions. Formally, the dynamics of the debt can be analyzed starting 
from the definition of the government budget constraint. 
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If we introduce equation (1) into equation (2), we will obtain 
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If r < x, then either a budget surplus (g-t) or a money supply will be 
necessary. The ratio debt/GDP will become stable when 
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Equation 4 shows that when the interest rate to the government debt gets 
increased faster than the GDP, the ratio between debt and GDP gets increased 
without limits. In other words, the deficit may explode. The increase of the debt 
accumulation can be stopped if the primary deficit (expressed as a percentage of 
the GDP) turns into surplus (g – t) < 0. Thus, if the interest rate exceeds the rate of 
economic growth, either the stabilization of a primary surplus (t > g), or the 
increase of the money quantity will be necessary, which has to be enough so as to 
stabilize the ratio between debt and GDP (by Grauwe, 2003). On the other hand, 
relation 4 shows that the stabilization of the public debt at its sustainable level 
depends on the following: a national economy's capacity to generate primary 
surpluses, the interests to which the markets grant loans to the state, according to 
the attached risk premium, as well as its own rate of economic growth.  
If a country is part of a monetary union, then the effects are the more 
important. A country encountering problems related to the sustainability of the 
budget/public debt sustainability generates negative externalities within that 
monetary union. In case a country allows the increase of the current budget deficit 
so that the interest rate to the government debt exceeds the rate of economic 
growth, then it will be constrained to appeal more and more frequently to the 
capital markets from the monetary union, thus generating pressures meaning the 
increase of the interest rates. But the increase of the interest rates results in the 
increase of the debt burden for the other countries from the monetary union. If the 
governments of these countries decide to stabilize the ratio between debt and GDP, 
they will be forced to adopt restrictive fiscal policies. Consequently, an 
unsustainable increase of some countries' budget deficits will force other countries 
from the monetary union to follow deflationary policies and exactly these countries 
support the necessity of a control mechanism which makes the restrictions for the 
extent of the budget deficits possible. Another possible negative externality of the 
unsustainable budget deficits affect the central bank from the monetary union 
(ECB). The countries affected by the increase of the interest rates may put Sustainability of the public debt and the financial crisis 
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pressures upon the central bank, meaning the relaxation of the monetary policy. 
Thus, the unsustainable fiscal policies promoted by the national governments may 
come into conflict with the monetary policy which covers the entire monetary 
union (Grauwe, 2003). 
 
Determining the limit of the sustainable public debt and of the insolvency  
The sustainability relation described above may also be viewed from 
another perspective. Thus, the relation between the term (r-x)  d, which does 
not represent but the net financing need, and (pb) – primary surplus, or rather a 
country's capacity to generate primary surpluses (as it is described in IMF, 
2011) determines the sustainable level of a country's public debt. (Figure 1). It 
is well known that a higher and higher level of the public debt determines a less 
and less sustainable fiscal policy and debt. This is because – ceteris paribus – a 
higher debt supposes a higher primary surplus in order to support it. Moreover, 
higher rates of the debt in the GDP are usually associated with higher interest 
rates and, very likely, low rates of economic growth, this creating, again, a 
primary surplus which is too high to be able to balance the situation again. 
Hypotheses such as the existence of high interest rates or of a low economic 
growth, for example, result in a less favorable dynamics of the public debt, thus 
requiring an increase of the primary balance in order to stabilize the share of the 
public debt in the GDP, which could further determine modifications in the 
analysis related to the debt sustainability. 
The empirical evidences show that the countries starting from high shares 
of the public debts in the GDP are more sensitive to the shocks determined by 
the increase of the interest rate and/or by the decrease of the economic growth 
rate. The higher the initial level of the debt, the greater is the impact of a given 
increase of the interest rate or of a decrease of the economic growth upon the 
primary surplus required to maintain the debt stable. Beside certain levels, a 
higher level of the public debt results in a low rate of economic growth on a 
long-term (Kumar, Woo, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Limit of the sustainable debt  
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Point d* is the point in which (r-x)  d is equal to  pb and it represents the 
sustainable level of the public debt. We can notice that in the first part of the 
chart the curve describing the primary surplus-generating capacity (pb reaction 
function) is more elastic than in the second part. This means that, starting from 
the initial levels of a low debt, then the necessity to generate a primary surplus 
is quite low. In the second part, the primary surplus-generating capacity 
saturates, this meaning that, beside the level d*, any increase of the debt results 
in a necessity to generate much higher primary surpluses. As we have 
previously shown, if the own rate of economic growth is lower than the interest 
to which the state grants loans, then it is necessary to generate primary surplus 
in order to stabilize the debt. An economy's primary surplus-generating capacity 
is determined based on an estimation made for the reaction function of the 
fiscal policy. 
 
3. Public debt sustainability in Romania. Effects under the terms  
 of entry into the Euro zone 
 
Under the terms of Romania's proposing to be part of the Euro zone, we 
make further a risk analysis for Romania's public debt sustainability for the 
period 2010-2015, after a procedure calibrated according to the public debt 
sustainability made by World bank experts, the resulting toolkit providing 
indicators able to identify the risks and vulnerabilities of the debt. This toolkit 
uses three categories of variables as inputs: macroeconomic, budgetary and 
related to the debt, making calculations starting from the trajectory of the public 
debt in the GDP to the profile of the public debt, making an analysis of the risks 
related to re-financing and cash, by using Monte Carlo simulations. Moreover, 
we may estimate the risks associated with the shocks upon the public debt as a 
result of various hypotheses related to the evolution of the rate of exchange, of 
inflation and of the real GDP increase rate, thus generating various stochastic 
scenarios. 
The inputs necessary to the analysis are divided into three categories:   
a) Macroeconomic variables (the real economic growth rate, the initial GDP, 
the domestic inflation rate, the foreign inflation rate, the share of the tradable 
goods sector in the GDP, the rate of exchange and the real interest rate to the 
initial debt and to the new debt – domestic and foreign); b) Budgetary variables 
(the share of the primary budget balance in the GDP and the initial payments 
with interests to the public debt) and c) Variables related to the public debt (the 
initial weight of the debt in the GDP expressed in national currency, the 
maturity profile for the initial debt stock expressed in the national currency, the 
initial share of the debt in the GDP expressed in foreign currencies, the maturity 
profile for the initial debt stock expressed in foreign currencies, the share of the Sustainability of the public debt and the financial crisis 
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debt in the newly created debt expressed in foreign currencies and the maturity 
profile of the newly created debt). 
In the first scenario, we analyzed the public debt sustainability based on 
the official macroeconomic hypotheses of the National Forecast Commission 
and the Ministry of Public Finance. The share of the tradable goods sector has 
been estimated based on the added value brought by the output in the total 
added value. The real rate of interest has been calculated based on the data 
provided by the National Bank of Romania. The estimates for the primary 
budget balance have been based on the hypotheses provided in the Government 
Debt Management Strategy for 2011-2013. Considering the macroeconomic 
data from the official scenario, we have obtained a trajectory for the dynamics 
of the public debt, which is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
The dynamics of the public debt – The official scenario 
Years  Debt to GDP
(%) 
Total debt dynamics 
mld Ron 
2010 34.29 180,0
2011 36.74 205,9
2012 38.43 227,9
2013 38.56 242,6
2014 37.87 251,9
2015 37.45 249,6
Source: author's calculations. 
 
We can notice that the share of the public debt in the GDP will increase 
from 36.7% in 2011 up to 38.6% in 2013, and then tending to decrease up to 
37.9% in 2014, 37.45% in 2015, respectively as a result of the high rates of 
economic growth taken into account and of the decrease of the real interest rate. 
Moreover, the primary deficit as a share in the GDP is improving from 2.7% of 
the GDP in 2012 up to 0.5% of the GDP in 2014.  
In the second scenario, we have introduced four hypotheses with a high 
realism degree, accounting for the nature of the new macroeconomic European 
framework and the new domestic macroeconomic situation. Thus, we have 
considered as follows: the decrease by one percent of the economic growth rate 
in each of the years 2012/2015; the increase by one percent of the real interest 
rate in each of the years 2012/2015; the increase by one percent of the primary 
budget deficit in each of the years 2012/2015 and the maintenance of the 
estimates for the domestic inflation, the foreign inflation and the share of the 
tradable goods in the GDP.  
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Table 2  
The dynamics of the public debt – The pessimistic scenario 
Years  Debt to GDP 
(%) 
Total debt dynamics 
mld Ron 
2010 34.29 180,0
2011 36.74 205,9
2012 39.95 236,2
2013 39.64 249,4
2014 41.26 274,5
2015 41.98 280,7
Source: author's calculations. 
 
The sensitivity analysis for the public debt in the hypothesis of the 
pessimistic scenario shows a share of the public debt in the GDP of 39.95%, this 
representing an increase by 1.5 percents of the GDP compared to the estimate 
made in 2012 for the same year. The major difference for the public debt dynamics 
in the two estimates is given by the fact that, in the pessimistic scenario, the share 
of the public debt marginally decreases in 2013, up to 39.64% of the GDP, and 
then it increases in 2014 up to 41.26% of the GDP (in the optimistic scenario, the 
share of the public debt in the GDP was getting marginally increased in 2013 
compared to 2012, from 38.43% of the GDP up to 38.56% of the GDP, after which 
it was getting decreased in 2014 up to 37.87% of the GDP).  
Moreover, the result of the calculations made was that the constant 
primary surplus necessary to stabilize the public debt to the level from 2011, 
considered sustainable for the Romanian economy (namely 37% of the GDP), is 
0.3% of the GDP (the hypothesis of the official scenario) and 0.8% of the GDP 
(the hypothesis of the pessimistic scenario). As solutions for improvement of 
the debt sustainability and/or risk management, we may propose: the annual 
review of the government public debt management strategy or, whenever the 
market conditions and/or the financing needs require it; maintainance under 
control of the refinancing risk through bond exchange instruments (conversion 
of the medium-term securities into long-term securities) and buyback (rebuying 
securities in advance) – these instruments being specific to the secondary 
securities market; extension of the securities due time by issuing a significant 
proportion from the financing need with medium and long-term due times, 
obtaining loan contracts from international financial institutions with medium 
and long-term due times, the development of a financial buffer in foreign 
currency which could cover the financing need of the deficit and the refinancing 
of the public debt for approximately four months; the active management of the 
cash by placing fixed-term deposits at the Romanian financial institutions, 
collateralized with securities; the performance of repo and reverse repo 
operations (buying securities with the seller's obligation to rebuy them at a 
higher price within the term agreed in the convention); conventions agreed with Sustainability of the public debt and the financial crisis 
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the pension funds from pylon 2 so that they could rebuy the securities on a 
medium and long term; the analysis of the opportunity to rebuy, in advance, for 
certain loans previously agreed upon at very high interests, mutually agreed 
with the financing institutions; the issuance of inflation indexed securities on 
the domestic market (especially for the population and for the banks, in order to 
diversify the risk); the decrease of the foreign exchange risk by increasing the  
share of the government public debt denominated in lei in the total debt; the 
active management of the foreign exchange risk by using foreign exchange 
swap instruments; the active management of the interest rate by using the 
interest rate swap instruments; the increase of the share of the public debt with 
fixed interest; the development of the occurring opportunities related to the 
financing on the foreign markets; the constant going out on the foreign markets 
in order to increase the investors' confidence. 
 
Conclusions 
 
When the crisis appeared in the whole world, it shook even the most solid 
European economies, and, until the end of 2009, the Euro zone entered the first 
stage of a severe public debt crisis. On the background of the severe structural 
problems, the lack of competitiveness has constituted the main factor resulting in 
the severe deterioration of the European public finances. The external deficits have 
put additional pressure upon the fiscal deficits. Practically, they entered a vicious 
circle. One of the main lessons of the current crisis for a country, and much more 
for a country which is part of a monetary union or which prepares itself to enter a 
monetary union, is that the public debt sustainability becomes an essential 
condition. The public debt stabilization to its sustainable level depends on the 
following: a national economy's capacity to generate primary surpluses, the interest 
to which the markets grant loans to the state, according to the attached risk 
premium, as well as its own rate of economic growth. This means that the idea of 
debt sustainability must be thought of in individual terms, as long as it depends on 
its own economic conditions. As for Romania, the risks related to the above-
mentioned estimates – both scenarios – may be considered to be of medium 
intensity. The risks are rather related to the necessity to generate primary surplus in 
order to stabilize the debt at its sustainable level. 
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Note 
 
(1)  Adapted from Llewellyn and P.  Westaway, 2011.	
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